Constituency Campaigning and Canvassing for Support at the 2011 National Assembly of Wales Election
An increasing volume of research has suggested the efficacy of get-out-the-vote campaigns in the UK; having identified its potential supporters, a party then contacts them to encourage them to turn out on election day, and those contacted are more likely to reward the party by voting for it than are those not contacted. This paper illustrates these findings with data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study. Each of the four main parties concentrated its attention on those who voted for it at the previous contest in 2007; those contactedespecially those contacted via media other than leaflets -were more likely to vote for the party again in 2011 than those who were not contacted. Keywords: campaigning, contact, voting, Wales, 2011 Research during the last three decades has substantially overturned the previous belief among UK psephologists that local campaigning at British general elections has little if any impact on the outcome. Early studies used a range of indicators of campaign intensity in individual constituenciesthe amount of money spent by candidates (e.g. Johnston, 1987) ; the number of party activists in a constituency who worked for it at election time (e.g. Whiteley and Seyd, 1994; Fisher et al., 2014) ; and the intensity of activity as revealed by surveys of candidates' agents (e.g. Denver and Hands, 1997) -with all finding that the greater the intensity, the better the candidate's/party's performance. Subsequent investigations have confirmed these findings (as reviewed in Johnston and Pattie, 2006, 2014) , but in all of them the processes of mobilisation have only been inferred. They assume that the greater the intensity of a party's campaign in a constituency the more voters it contacts there, and that those contacted by a party are more likely to vote for its candidate than those who are not.
In the absence of experimental studies of the efficacy get-out-the-vote campaigns (such as those undertaken in the USA - Green and Gerber, 2004; though see Denver 2014 ) the veracity of those assumptions could not be tested robustly with the cross-sectional data available from electoral surveys. During the last decade, however, panel surveys of substantial samples of voters contacted before and after a campaign -and in some cases at intervening dates during the campaign toohave provided data on the level of contact between parties and their potential supporters and delivered clear evidence that contact does aid mobilisation; electors contacted by a party during its canvassing activities are more likely to vote for it than those who receive no contact (Johnston et al., 2012 (Johnston et al., , 2013 .
Virtually all of that research has focused on general elections, which attract the highest levels of turnout within the UK. Other contests -such as those for local governments, devolved bodies, and the European Parliament -generally attract less attention from both the media and the voting public. In those cases, at which turnout is generally lower than at general elections, contact with one or more of the parties is likely to have a strong influence on whether members of the electorate vote. Some will always vote, because they see it as their civic duty to do so; some will never vote, because they are either alienated from the political arena or/and believe their votes would have no influence; and some may be inclined to vote, but the probability of their doing so is influenced by whether their support is canvassed. Parties concentrate their canvassing and campaigning activities on the last of those groups, initially to identify them (in some cases updating records of their F o r R e v i e w O n l y 2 supporters from previous elections) and then mobilising those whose support is perceived as vital to their success by contacting (and in some cases re-contacting) them again as election day approaches.
In this paper, we explore whether contacting was an important influence on voting at the 2011 elections to the National Assembly for Wales, using data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study.
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Although this study had a panel design, we focus here on the post-election wave, in which respondents were asked about contacts with the parties during the election campaign, and how they voted on the day. 2 We also use recall data obtained in the pre-election wave on how respondents voted at the previous Assembly election in 2007 to identify which types of voter were contacted by the parties, where, in 2011 and whether their support for a party at the previous election was more likely to be sustained if contacted by that party during the following campaign; or whether contact from another party led to them changing who they voted for.
The National Assembly for Wales is elected by a form of semi-proportional representation. It comprises 60 Assembly Members (AMs): 40 are elected from single-member constituencies using the first-part-the-post plurality system, and the other 20 from party lists in five regions, with allocation of the latter seats taking into account the distribution of the constituency seats. Our attention here focuses mainly on the 40 contests for constituency members, although some of the canvassing and campaigning by the parties will have been directed as much at voting in the regional list contests as in those for the constituency members (on which see more below).
Much of the research reported on campaign effects has used relatively sophisticated statistical procedures, designed to control for other factors in order to focus directly on any independent influences that local campaigning might have on voting patterns. In this paper, however, our approach, as described below, is based on examining the main patterns in the raw data only. Those data strongly indicate that contacting voters brought substantial benefits: individuals contacted by a party, especially those who previously supported it, were more likely to vote for it than those who were not.
The election
Some analysts treat contests for bodies within the UK such as the National Assembly of Wales as 'second order elections' at which, at least in part, voters take the opportunity to evaluate the party(ies) in power at Westminster following the preceding general election; negative evaluations by those who previously voted for the party(ies) in power there result in either (temporary) transfer of their support to one of the opposition parties or abstention. Recent analyses have suggested, however, that many voters treat elections to the 'devolved bodies' as 'local first order elections', making partisan choices on the basis of their evaluations of the performance of the party(ies) in power there (Scully, 2013; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006) . In this case, therefore, in determining their choices voters would be reflecting in 2011 on the Welsh government's performance over the preceding four years. 1 The 2011 Welsh Election Study was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062-23-2625) . The study was co-directed by Roger Scully and Richard Wyn Jones, with all fieldwork carried out by YouGov via the internet. 2 The pre-election wave was a rolling survey during the month preceding the election, with around one-quarter of the respondents interviewed in each of those four weeks. Although it can be used to investigate changes in attitudes and planned voting during the campaign itself, there is potential overlap in the responses to the contact questions; those interviewed with the pre-election campaign were asked about contact with the parties but those not interviewed until late in the campaign could have given the same responses as when they were interviewed post-campaign. The 2011 Welsh Assembly election was held at the end of a period of coalition government. With 26 seats Labour was short of an overall majority after the 2007 contest; after a brief period in which it operated a minority administration, it entered into a coalition with Plaid Cymru, which held 15 seats. The Conservatives occupied 12 seats, the Liberal Democrats 6, and there was one independent member.
In 2011 Labour increased its share of the constituency votes by over 10 percentage points, from 32.2% to 42.3% (Table 1) , winning 28 of the 40 seats; a further two won in the list contests left it just one seat short of an overall majority. Both its previous coalition partner, Plaid Cymru, and the Liberal Democrats experienced losses of both votes and seats; the Conservatives somewhat increased their vote share and seat tally.
At the individual level, change in party support was relatively small between the two elections: 73 per cent of the 1,221 respondents who recalled voting for one of the four largest parties (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru) in 2007 reported voting for the same party again four years later.
3 Indeed, Table 2 shows that both the Conservatives and Labour retained the support of 81 per cent of their 2007 voters, and Plaid Cymru retained 69 per cent; the Liberal Democrats lost over half of their support, however, substantially to Labour and to a lesser extent to the other two. A majority of those who didn't vote in 2007 repeated that performance in 2011, and a majority of those who couldn't remember how they voted four years previously failed to vote in 2011.
The pattern of contact
In the post-election wave of the survey, respondents were asked 'Were you contacted by someone from a political party during the election campaign?'; if they answered yes, they were asked which parties. For each party they reported having been contacted by they were asked whether that was by: telephone call; leaflets or other mail delivered to your home; a visit to your home; contact in the street; email; Twitter, Facebook or other social networks; text message; and other. They were not asked how many times they were contacted by each method, however.
The main purpose of a local party's campaign is to identify individuals likely to vote for its candidate, and then try to ensure that they turn out and do so. The campaigning aims are thus partly informational -making sure voters know that there is an election, what the issues are, and who the party's local candidate is -and then mobilising the identified potential supporters. The focus of later activity is largely on the latter group: those seen as either committed or likely to vote for its candidate receive further attention to encourage them to turn out and vote, whereas others receive little, if any. Leaflets play an important informational role in this activity, but their delivery is in general less targeted than the other forms of contact: leaflets may be delivered to all homes in an area (selected usually because the party knows it is relatively strong there), for example, whereas the other forms of contact -especially home visits and personal contacts via email and text -are likely to be focused much more on known supporters only. For that reason we look separately at contact via leaflet only and via other methods. Table 3 shows the percentage of all respondents reporting contacts with the four main parties during the 2011 campaign: most reported no contact with each of the parties, and 73 per cent reported that they had not been contacted by any of them. Labour was by far the most active in contacting voters via all seven media -overall it contacted just under 18 per cent of all respondents -and the Liberal Democrats were the least active, contacting fewer than 8 per cent (and there was a Table 3 -and the overall result - Table 1 ). Contacting via a leaflet was the most commonly reported form for each party, and home visits the second most. Few voters said they were contacted via the more targeted 'modern' media (emails, texts and social networking sites); only Labour made (relatively) extensive use of the telephone to contact voters and the Liberal Democrats were the largest users of text messaging.
Contact and support
But was contacting effective? To answer that question we took respondents' recollection of how they voted at the previous, 2007, Welsh Assembly election and used that as the baseline for evaluating whether their behaviour changed between the two contests. In adopting this approach, we avoid the necessity of undertaking statistical analyses that take into account the sociodemographic and -economic characteristics of individual voters that many studies have shown strongly influence party choice at elections in Great Britain. Whether somebody votes Labour or not is a function of their individual characteristics but knowledge that they voted Labour at one election allows a successful prediction of how they will vote at a subsequent one without needing to take those characteristics into account, and thus obviates the need for sophisticated statistical modelling. Any change in voting behaviour between the two contests must therefore reflect other influences -such as contact from the party during the pre-election campaign -which enables our strategy of focusing on the raw data in a series of crosstabulations here.
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The question of the effectiveness of contacting is first addressed here by exploring whether voters who supported a party in the constituency contest in 2007 were more likely to do so again in 2011 if they were contacted during the latter campaign than if they were not. Table 4 gives fairly unequivocal evidence that they were; it contrasts, for each set of 2007 party supporters, those not contacted in the 2011 campaign with both those contacted by leaflet only and those contacted via one or more other methods.
Of the 236 respondents who voted Conservative in the 2007 constituency contests, 181 (77 per cent) recalled no contact from the party during the 2011 campaign; 78.5 per cent of them voted Conservative again. Of those who received a leaflet but no other contact (only 12 respondents), 83.3 per cent remained Conservative voters, whereas of those contacted via other, more personal, media, continued support for the party was higher: among the 30 contacted through one medium other than a leaflet it was 93.3 per cent, and all of those contacted through more than two media remained Conservative voters (although the sample size for this group is extremely small). Similar differences are reported for the other three parties. The largest gap is for the Liberal Democrats, who did least campaigning overall; only 36.4 per cent of their 2007 voters not contacted supported the party again in 2011, compared to 71.4 per cent of those contacted through just one medium other than a leaflet. 4 The results of such analyses can be provided by the corresponding author on request. 5 As with Labour so with the other parties. A binary logistic regression predicting whether somebody voted Conservative in 2011 according to whether they did so in 2007 was 90 per cent correct -and none of the other variables was statistically significant when added at a second step. For the Liberal Democrats a comparable model was 92 per cent correct and for Plaid Cymru it was 90 per cent. Overall, therefore, contacting one's own supporters, especially through the more personal media, yielded returns -they were more likely to vote for the party again than those who were not contacted.
6 Can contact also win over converts? To address that question, we look at the 2007 supporters of the two parties in the constituency contests -Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymruwho were most likely to vote for another in 2011 (Table 2 ). The numbers are small, but the findings are in general as expected. The first block of data in Table 5 examines Liberal Democrat voters in 2007, of whom 19 switched to the Conservatives in 2011, 36 to Labour and 20 to Plaid Cymru, with 66 remaining loyal to the Liberal Democrats. The first row shows very clearly that those the Liberal Democrats ignored during their campaigns were more likely to defect: of those who remained loyal to the party 73 per cent had not been contacted during the 2011 campaign, whereas between 90-100 per cent of those who switched to one of the other three parties received no contact at all from the Liberal Democrats. The remaining rows show the percentages of those who either defected or remained loyal and who received contacts from the party they voted for in 2011. Of those who shifted to the Conservatives, 16 per cent were contacted by them in one or more ways other than by leaflets; of those who shifted to Labour the percentage was double that at 31, whereas it was 17 for those who moved to Plaid Cymru; and 18 per cent of those who remained loyal to the Liberal Democrats were contacted by that party other than by leaflet. Contact from the Liberal Democrats helped to retain some of its 2007 support; those ignored in 2011 but contacted by one of the other parties were more likely to defect to the latter, however.
Those who changed their allegiance from the Liberal Democrats were less likely to have been contacted during the Liberal Democrat campaign than those who remained loyal to the party, therefore, and were more likely to have been contacted -other than by leaflet -by the party to which they switched their support. The same was true with regard to the -smaller -numbers who defected from Plaid Cymru between the two contests. The more contact with Plaid Cymru in 2011, the more likely its 2007 supporters were to remain loyal; the more contact there was with another party, the more likely they were to switch allegiance.
What, finally, of the 374 respondents who didn't vote in the 2007 constituency contests, of whom 157 did turn out for one of the parties in 2011: were they more likely to do so if they were contacted?
7 Table 6 again suggests that this was the case. Those making a switch were more likely to have been contacted by the party that received their support in 2011 than those who were not. Among the switchers to Labour 23 per cent were contacted by that party, for example; only 8 per cent of them were contacted by either the Liberal Democrats or Plaid Cymru, and 11 per cent by the Conservatives. By contacting more potential switchers, Labour gained more converts. The difference was however smaller in the other three cases -especially for the Conservatives. In addition, those who remained as non-voters were very unlikely to have been contacted by any party during the campaign. Contacting -even if only by sending a leaflet -helped convince some non-voters to turn out and support the party seeking their vote.
But who was contacted, where?
In general, therefore, contacting worked: it helped both to mobilise each party's own supporters (according to their previous voting behaviour) and, to some extent, to win over those who supported 6 This was confirmed by binary logistic regression analyses. For those who supported each of the four parties in 2007: those not contacted by it during the 2011 campaign were significantly less likely to vote for it again then than those who were contacted; and there was a significant, positive relationship between the more ways in which individuals were contacted and the probability of them voting for the party again in 2011. Again, copies of the regression output can be provided on demand. 7 Most of these respondents abstained in 2007 but one-fifth of them were aged under 25, many of whom would have been too young to vote then. other parties at the preceding contest. But are the parties contacting the right people? If they want to get as many seats as possible within the constituency contest section of the election they should concentrate their contacting efforts on the marginal seats, those that they either won or lost at the previous contest by a relatively small majority. Turning out supporters again in constituencies where they have little or no chance of success will bring few rewards; nor will working too hard to mobilise support in constituencies where they are almost certain to win.
To test whether the parties operated such geographical targeting in 2011, the constituencies were grouped into four types for each party: those won by a safe margin in 2007 (by 10 percentage points or more); those won by a narrow margin then (less than ten points); those lost by a narrow margin (less than ten points); and the hopeless seats (lost by more than ten points). A rational campaign for constituency-contest votes would see the expenditure of human and financial resources concentrated in the second and third types, with very little in either the first or, especially, the fourth. However, the regional list element to the electoral system may undermine such considerations, making it worthwhile for parties to chase additional votes in apparently hopeless or ultra-safe constituencies. Table 7 records the percentages of each party's own constituency supporters in 2007 according to whether they had no contact with the party, whether any contact was by leaflet only, or whether there was one or more contact other than by leaflet -by seat type. In its safe seats, Labour made no contact with 81 per cent of those who voted for it in those constituencies in 2007, only slightly less than the 88 per cent of those who voted for other parties there. In the marginal constituencies which Labour won in 2007, however, there was a much wider gap: 84 per cent of those who voted for another party there in 2007 received no contact from Labour, compared to 67 per cent of Labour's own voters. In the marginal seats it lost in 2007 and where it hoped for gains in order to form a majority government, there was more contact with both types of voter: 57 per cent of all 2007 Labour voters there were contacted by the party in 2011, as were 25 per cent of those who did not vote Labour at the earlier contest (i.e. in the former case, 43 per cent were not contacted; in the latter, 75 per cent). Very few people in those marginal constituencies were contacted by leaflet alone; contacts via the other media were not only more numerous but also very much focused on the party's known supporters -with again the greatest amount of effort at winning over converts in the marginal seats where Labour lost in 2007 (17 per cent of non-Labour voters there were contacted, alongside 37 per cent of Labour's own voters -twice the percentages contacted in Labour's safe seats).
Labour clearly fought a relatively aggressive campaign according to these indicators, focusing in particular on the marginal seats that it lost in 2007 and paying relatively little attention to its supporters in its safe seats; it was campaigning to increase its vote and, especially, seat shares. If Labour was going to win an absolute majority in 2011, it was clearly going to do so mainly through constituency seat gains. The other parties operated more defensive campaigns, to a greater or lesser extent, seeking to sustain and consolidate support in their 'heartlands' rather than extend it -in part, no doubt, because they faced the challenge of holding onto territory against a resurgent Welsh Labour party. However, they also were perhaps more concerned than Labour with winning votes in the regional list contests Although the contests for the constituency and regional seats were separate, much of the campaigning for the two was common: each party sought to maximise its support in both contests, while reflecting on variations in their likelihood of winning there. (In South Wales, for example, Labour was expected to win most of the constituency contests, in which case it was very unlikely to obtain any of the regional 'top-up' seats as well -and this was the case, as Table 1 implies; in such a situation 'rational' Labour supporters might allocate their regional votes to their 'second choice parties'. The other parties' main chances there were to win regional seats, however, and their campaigning may have stressed that.) Most of those surveyed voted for the same party in both contests, however: of those who supported one of the four main parties in the 2011 constituency contests, 75 per cent voted for the same party in the regional contest. All four parties got fewer votes in the regional than the constituency contests, however, because many of the 'switchers' who voted for one of them in the latter contests voted for either the Greens or UKIP in their region (neither of those parties fielded candidates in the great majority of the constituency contests).
But did being contacted by a party during the campaign encourage support for it in the regional contest? Table 8 shows the percentages of those who voted for each of the parties in the constituency contests in 2011 and who also voted for it in the regional contests, according to their contacts with the party during the campaign. Multiple contacts, other than by leaflet, clearly had an impact; those contacted through a range of media (who were few in number) were most likely on average to vote for that party in the regional as well as the constituency component of the election.
Conclusions
Despite the strong tendency of political parties around the world towards running increasinglycentralised, leader-based election campaigns, local campaign activities remain an important part of what determines election outcomes. This paper has added further evidence towards this general conclusion, making two specific contributions. First, our evidence reinforces the importance of local efforts to 'get-out-the-vote'. Experimental research testing the efficacy of 'get-out-the-vote' campaigns has become quite common in the United States (Green and Gerber, 2004) , but for a variety of reasons has attracted less interest in the UK (though see Denver, 2014; Fieldhouse et al., 2013 Fieldhouse et al., , 2014 . That American research has delivered very strong, positive results: the more effort made to contact voters and encourage them to exercise their democratic franchise, the more who do. Voters, on average, apparently appreciate not being taken for granted but instead respond positively to being informed personally about the election and having their support solicited.
The data presented here for the 2011 Welsh Assembly elections have identified patterns consistent with those arguments. They are not conclusive evidence that contacting matters. It is possible that all those contacted had already decided how they would vote irrespective of any later contact; alternatively, the parties focused their efforts very strongly on those who had already made decisions favourable to them. If not conclusive, however, the data provide strong circumstantial evidence that, at this Welsh election:
the parties focused their campaigning in targeted constituencies where they either wanted to win again or had a good chance of removing the incumbent party; and those who supported a party in the constituency contests and were contacted by it were also more likely to support it at the regional contests too.
Those contacted responded by voting for the party that got in touch with them -much more so than those not contacted. The 2011 Welsh local campaigns were effective, therefore: the more effort it expended in getting-out-the-vote, the better each party's performance.
Second, our work here extends research on local campaigning in the UK to the conduct of devolved elections. We have shown that in these rather lower-key electoral contests, and despite them being held under a two-ballot, semi-proportional electoral system, local constituency campaigning can still play a very important part in the final outcome. Voters contacted by the political parties -especially by the one they have previously supported -are more likely to reward them with their continued support than are those who are ignored by the campaign. Contact matters, even in highly centralised campaigns. 
